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Abstract 
The government of British Columbia imposes restrictions on the export of logs from 
public and private forestlands, primarily to promote local processing and associated employment 
benefits. Economists wholeheartedly oppose BC’s export restrictions, arguing that BC’s citizens 
are worse off as a result of the government’s measures. In this paper, it is shown that, while free 
trade in logs might well maximize global wellbeing, it might not necessarily result in the greatest 
benefit to British Columbia. Indeed, both economic theory and a follow-up numerical analysis 
indicate that some restrictions on the export of logs can lead to higher welfare for BC than free 
trade.  
 
Keywords: international trade; log exports; forest industry; quota rents 
JEL categories: F13, F14, Q23, Q27, Q28 
Page 2 of 25 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Regardless of their political stripe (socialist or free market), governments in many 
jurisdictions attempt to manage or regulate their forest resources to achieve the greatest possible 
employment. This has resulted in log export restrictions in countries as diverse as the United 
States, Russia and Canada. In the U.S. Pacific Northwest, Oregon imposed a ban on the export of 
logs from state owned lands in 1961 in an effort to protect local manufacturing jobs; California 
followed suite in 1972. Then in 1973 the U.S. Congress prohibited the export of any logs 
harvested on federal lands west of the 100th Meridian, followed in 1990 by a ban on log exports 
from Washington’s state-owned lands and harvest reductions on all forestlands in the PNW to 
protect the Spotted Owl as permitted under the Endangered Species Act of 1973. Log exports 
from the PNW soared from about 1.0 million m3 in the early 1960s to 8.7 million m3, or 24% of 
the total harvest, by 1988, before falling back down to just over 1.0 million m3 by the early 
2000s (Daniels 2005). In 2010, 2.6 million m3 of logs were exported, but this still constituted 
19% of the total harvest (Kerr 2012). Of course, the exported logs came from private lands.  
In Russia, investments in sawmilling and other processing capacity has historically 
lagged resource availability; by 2001, only two regions processed more than 25% of harvested 
logs while the other five regions utilized less than 10% (see Simeone and Eastin 2012). This led 
the government to incentivize investment in processing capacity by restricting log exports. An ad 
valorem export tax of 6.5% was imposed beginning January 1, 2007; the tax was increased to 
20% on July 1, 2007 and then to 25% on April 1, 2008; and it was set to increase to 80% on 
January 1, 2009, but this was delayed indefinitely as a result of the financial crisis and pressure 
from the Scandinavian countries. The trade measures reduced roundwood log exports from 51.1 
million m3 in 2006 to 21.9 million m3 in 2011, although some of this decline could be attributed 
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to the global recession. On August 22, 2012, Russia officially joined the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and, as part of its accession package, it agreed to reduce tariffs on log 
exports to 8% by 2015. However, since Russia was permitted to establish a volume tariff rate 
quota (TRQ), the 8% rate only applied to log exports below the quota. For exports above the 
quota, an export tax of 80% could be applied; in essence, then, the quota would be effective.  
British Columbia has likewise restricted log exports from provincial forestlands, 
including private lands that account for only about 4% of the province’s commercial forestland 
(Wilson et al. 1998, p.13).1 A total ban on log exports from Crown (publicly-owned) land was 
put in place as early as 1891, but legislation to allow exemptions already came a decade later 
(1901). The Timber Manufacture Act (1906) extended the ban on log exports from Crown land 
to private lands that had previously been granted to the private owner by the provincial (as 
opposed to federal) government; this was followed in December 1907 by Order-in-Council #901 
that put a halt to the further transfer of Crown land to private ownership.2
Forest companies in BC currently can only export logs if they are declared ‘surplus’ to 
domestic requirements – that is, no domestic buyer for the logs is forthcoming, or offers to 
purchase ‘surplus’ logs are deemed inadequate. A provincial Timber Export Advisory 
 An amendment to the 
Timber Manufacture Act in 1909, however, provided a means for obtaining exemptions to the 
log export ban. Since then, enforcement of the export ban has been relaxed or tightened 
depending on the economic and political situation, but the government has always maintained 
some flexibility to permit log exports (see Dumont and Wright 2006). 
                                                 
1 It is important to note that private forestlands are often managed as part of an integrated Tree Farm 
License that consists primarily of publicly-own timberlands (see Wang et al. 2014). This then provides 
some justification for government control over log exports from private forests. 
2 The federal government had granted land to the Canadian Pacific Railroad (CPR) for constructing a 
transcontinental railway; National Parks are also federal. Private forestlands were thus purchased from or 
granted by the province, or purchased from CPR. An example of the latter is the Darkwoods property in 
southeastern BC that is now owned by the Nature Conservancy of Canada (see van Kooten et al. 2012).  
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Committee (TEAC) advises on disparities between offers and bids, permitting log exports when 
‘warranted’.3
Historically, log exports rose when lumber markets were weak, but fell as demand picked 
up. Today, despite regulatory oversight, log exports from BC have become an important feature 
of BC’s external trade.  In 1987, BC exported nearly 4 million m3 of raw logs, but a decade later 
exports had fallen to less than ½ million m3. Log exports rose dramatically since 1997; by 2005, 
they reached nearly 5 million m3, falling to about 3 million m3 by 2009 as a result of the global 
financial crisis, and then rising rapidly to 5.7 million m3 in 2012 and an estimated 6.5 million m3 
or more in 2013 (Figure 1). Meanwhile, exports of softwood lumber remained relatively constant 
from 1988 to the early 2000s, then rose rapidly to a peak of 32.8 million m3 in 2006 before 
falling to 17.8 million m3 in 2009, after which they began to climb back towards historic levels. 
In 2012, BC’s log exports were valued at $576.8 million compared to $4,204.0 million for 
softwood lumber exports, or 13.7% of lumber export value; for January through September 2013, 
log exports were valued at $596.7 million compared to lumber exports of $3,955.1 million, or 
15.1% of lumber export value. 
 Companies exporting logs pay a fee in ‘lieu of manufacture’ – a payment (or 
penalty) for lost opportunities in the processing sector – and must obtain an export permit from 
the Canadian Border Services Agency (a payment to the federal government). The former fee 
depends on domestic and export prices and is in addition to any stumpage fees the logging 
company pays to the province. 
                                                 
3 TEAC falls under the purview of the Ministry of Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations. 
Information about the steps required to be able to export logs can be found at the provincial website  
http://www.for.gov.bc.ca/het/export.htm and, since a federal export permit is also required, at the website 
of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada http://www.international.gc.ca/controls-
controles/logs-bois/index.aspx?view=d (both viewed 21 November 2013). 
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Figure 1: British Columbia log and softwood lumber exports, 1988-2013 (Source: BC Stats 2013a) 
The debate about log exports assumes that the scale of British Columbia’s log exports is 
sufficiently large to affect world prices (Margolick and Uhler 1992; Zhang 1996; Fooks et al. 
2013). Empirical support for this assumption has recently been provided by Niquidet and Tang 
(2013). Some support for this is also provided in Figure 2. As BC’s log exports rose beginning in 
the late 1990s (Figure 1), export and domestic prices began to converge.  
Demand for BC logs has come almost exclusively from countries in the Pacific Rim, 
particularly Japan, China, South Korea and even the United States. China has become a major 
importer of raw logs, now accounting for nearly half of BC’s log exports. From importing an 
insignificant amount of logs in the mid-1990s, China now purchases well over 20 million m3 
annually, with nearly 3 million m3 coming from BC (2013). Given its proximity, Chinese 
imports of Russian logs rose rapidly from almost nothing in 1997 to over 20 million m3 in 2007, 
after which Russia’s exports of raw logs declined significantly (as discussed above). Given 
China’s apparently insatiable demand for logs, the Russian policy caused log prices to rise and, 
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along with the financial crisis and accompanying recession in the developed countries, this 
provided the opportunity for New Zealand, the U.S. and Canada to increase log exports to China 
as indicated in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 2: Domestic and export prices for British Columbia logs, 1988-2013 (Source: BC Ministry of 
Forests, Land and Natural Resource Operations 2013; BC Stats 2013b) 
 
 
Figure 3: Exports of industrial roundwood logs to China by major supplier, 1997-2010  
(Source: FAO 2012) 
Trade economists are almost all agreed that “log export bans and restrictions could have 
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p.1103). Indeed, in their empirical investigation of BC’s log export policy, Fooks et al. (2013, 
p.1111) conclude that the province has substantial potential to gain from the removal of its 
export restrictions.4
As opposed to a static argument against log export restrictions, a dynamic one might have 
greater traction. By permitting log exports, timber owners receive higher prices for logs than they 
would otherwise. This provides an incentive to increase investment in the production of logs – in 
activities that increase the commercial timber value of stands. In so doing, more logs are 
produced, log prices fall and local manufacturers can also benefit. Employment in forest-level 
activities increases but it might not come at less job loss in downstream manufacturing than 
initially anticipated. Yet, even in this case, the outcome depends on how scarcity rents created by 
log export restrictions are allocated. Clearly, if they are wasted through needless transaction 
costs imposed on firms seeking to export logs, the situation differs from that where the log 
producer (or landowner) captures the (scarcity) rents from restricting log exports.  
 Margolick and Uhler (1992) and Zhang (1996) make similar arguments in 
favour of removing all restrictions on BC’s log exports. By eliminating restrictions on log 
exports, producers will generally gain more than consumers lose and, as a result, the economy as 
a whole benefits. As demonstrated in this paper, this conclusion is not necessarily supported 
theoretically or empirically. The reason is that none of the aforementioned studies includes the 
potential scarcity rents that one finds in log markets (see van Kooten and Folmer 2004, pp.38-44; 
van Kooten and Johnston 2014).  
The purpose of the current paper is to examine this issue using applied welfare economic 
analysis. In particular, it answers the question of whether British Columbia should change its 
policy regarding limited log exports. We begin in the next section by developing a theoretical 
                                                 
4 The authors make no distinction between a log export ban and log export restrictions, using the terms 
interchangeably throughout. 
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framework for analysing the policy. This is followed by an empirical investigation of the BC 
policy, and a concluding discussion. 
2. WELFARE ECONOMICS OF LOG EXPORT RESTRICTIONS 
The initial situation and case for free trade in logs (or some other commodity) can be 
examined with the aid of Figure 4. Price and quantity under autarky are PA ($/m3) and qA (m3), 
respectively. With complete free trade, BC faces an excess demand for logs from the rest of the 
world given by ED, while ES is BC’s excess supply and ES′ = ES + T is the relevant excess 
supply as it includes transportation costs of $T/m3. The gains from trade are determined as 
follows: Compared to autarky (no trade), consumers in British Columbia lose (β+γ), but 
producers gain (β+γ+δ) for a net gain to the province from trade of δ. This gain can be 
represented in the international market as well, with δ = X+Y; the gain to foreigners, on the other 
hand, is given by area Z, although it is not possible in this diagram to determine the extent to 
which foreign producers lose and foreign consumers gain. However, since the price in the 
foreign market ( w lIntP ' ) is less than the excess demand choke price (equal to the autarkic price in 
the foreign market), foreign consumers must gain more than producers lose. Finally, notice that 
the price in the international market exceeds that in the BC domestic market w lIntP ' > P
w, as a result 
of transportation costs, which amount to area (ε1 + ε2).  
Now consider an alternative situation where the starting point is not autarky, but one 
where limited log exports are already permitted. Let QR = q1 – q0  be the level of log exports that 
British Columbia permits in any year, although it does not permit free trade. The discussion of 
the changes in welfare in going from restricted log exports to free trade in logs is facilitated with 
the aid of Figure 5, which expands upon Figure 4. 
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Figure 4: Analysis of British Columbia Permitting Free Trade in Logs 
 
 
Figure 5: Analysis of the Welfare Impacts to British Columbia of Free Trade in Logs when Log 
Export Restrictions Exist 
If BC restricts log exports to the amount QR (=q1–q0), this shifts the relevant excess 
supply function to ESR. Logs are sold at price R lIntP '  in the international market, but the price 
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received by domestic log producers is P1 as a result of transportation costs T. To clear the 
domestic market, however, the price that BC consumers pay under restricted log exports is P0. 
Compared to autarky, the limited export of logs causes domestic consumers to lose (a+b+x) 
while producers gain (a+b+x+c) for a net gain of c. In addition, area (j+f) is a surplus created by 
policy-induced scarcity; it could be wasted through the export-permitting process, or captured by 
the log exporter, public or private landowner, government, or some other entity.  
Starting from limited exports, if log exports are now freely permitted, the world price Pw 
becomes relevant for BC and it exports QW logs (at the price given in the international market). 
Compared to the restricted log export situation, free trade in logs causes BC consumers to lose 
(d+e) and producers to gain (d+e+y+g–j), assuming for simplicity that areas f and j accrued to 
the producers when log trade was restricted to QR. The net gain to BC is thus (y+g–j) with j lost 
because of the price decline in the international market as monopoly power is removed. Most 
analyses of log export restrictions ignore this policy-induced scarcity-rent component of the trade 
restriction. If the elasticities of supply and demand in each of the markets are known, it would be 
possible to calculate the relevant welfare areas and determine whether international free trade in 
logs is preferred to limited trade.  
3. IMPLEMENTING THE TRADE MODEL 
Margolick and Uhler (1992), Zhang (1996), and Fooks et al. (2013) approach the trade 
restriction in the same fashion. They estimate supply and demand functions for logs in British 
Columbia and then employ assumptions about how prices in international markets are impacted 
by changes in BC log exports. Indeed, Margolick and Uhler (1992) and Zhang (1996) construct 
demand and supply curves for the foreign market (presumably equivalent to the international 
market in Figures 4 and 5), with Zhang even estimating the supply and demand functions for 
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both BC (as do Fooks et al. 2013) and the PNW. Nowhere do any of these authors construct 
excess supply and demand curves, or otherwise explicitly link the domestic and foreign markets. 
This requires them instead to make arbitrary assumptions about the extent to which prices in 
other markets are impacted by changes in BC log export policy.  
Demand and Supply Assumptions 
To quantify the welfare impacts of log export restrictions, linear supply and demand 
functions are assumed. In particular, we assume the following domestic supply and demand 
functions: 
[1] Pd = α – β q  α, β ≥ 0  
[2] Ps = a + b q, a, b ≥ 0 
We can solve for the excess supply function as the quantity difference between supply and 
demand at each given price: 
[3] PES = q
b
b
b
ba
β
β
β
αβ
+
+
+
+  and 
[4] PES′ = q
b
bT
b
ba
β
β
β
αβ
+
++
+
+ , 
where T is the transportation cost.  
The respective domestic demand and supply elasticities are given by: 
[5] εd = q
p
q
p
dp
dq
β
1
−=  and εs = q
p
bq
p
dp
dq 1
= . 
We can then calculate the parameters in [1] and [2] as a function of εd, εs, p and q, which are the 
Page 12 of 25 
 
available from various sources (as discussed below). The parameters for domestic supply and 
demand functions are thus: 
[6] β = 
q
pd
dε
1− , α = pd (1 – 
dε
1 ), b =
q
pS
sε
1 ,  and a = ps (1 – 
sε
1 ). 
We can do the same for an assumed linear excess demand function, PED = k0 – k1q. The 
price elasticity of ED is given by: 
[7] εED = R
R
lInt
R
R
lInt
Q
p
kQ
p
dp
dq '
1
' 1−= , 
so that k1 = R
R
lInt
ED Q
p '1
ε
− and k0 = R lIntp ' (1 –
EDε
1 ). In these cases, R lIntp '  refers to the excess demand 
price in the international market for the quota-constrained quantity of logs QR exported by 
British Columbia (Figure 5). 
In the Appendix, we demonstrate that the optimal level of log exports that maximizes the 
quota rent is QR* = ½ QW, but the level that maximizes the overall benefit to British Columbia is 
QB = WQ
kw
kw






+
+
1
1
43
22 . Finally, it is shown that 0 < QR* < QB < QW. These relations are worth 
considering when evaluating BC policy regarding log export restrictions. However, empirical 
values of the various parameters are needed to determine whether BC’s policy is preferred to the 
alternative of free trade.  
Parameter Values 
To determine the welfare areas identified in Figure 5, it is necessary to have information 
on domestic consumption and production of logs, exports of logs (quota amount), the elasticities 
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of domestic demand and supply, and the elasticity of excess demand. Elasticity of demand and 
supply estimates for British Columbia are available from various sources. For example, Fooks et 
al. (2013) estimated a price elasticity of demand of –1.10, while Zhang (1996) employs an 
estimate of εs = –0.76. In a survey of the forest economics literature, Devadoss (2008) finds 
estimates for BC range between –0.2 and –2.0. 
As to the price elasticity of supply, van Kooten and Johnston (2014) found estimates 
ranging from 0.8 to 1.1, but employed εs = 1.0 because it has the convenient property that any 
linear supply function with an elasticity of 1.0 passes through the origin. Fooks et al. (2013) 
estimate the elasticity of supply to equal 1.03, while Zhang (1996) estimated an unusually low 
elasticity of supply for BC of εs = 0.11. Since logs for export originate almost exclusively on the 
BC coast, Margolick and Uhler (1992) employ εs = 0.3 (for the BC coast only).  
Finally, we require estimates of the elasticity of excess demand for BC logs. Niquidet and 
Tang (2013) estimate Marshallian excess demand elasticities for Canadian log imports by China 
and Japan. Since imports of Canadian logs originate entirely from British Columbia, these 
estimates constitute the excess demand elasticities for the purposes of our model. The estimates 
are as follows: εED = –1.40 (China) and εED = –1.67 (Japan). 
A summary of the reference data is provided in Table 1. Log sales and price data come 
from BC Stats (2013a), with log export data also available from BC Stats (2013b). Price 
elasticity data come from the sources indicated above. Given that there are various estimates of 
the domestic demand and supply elasticities, a ‘most likely’ value and range of values from 
‘lowest possible’ to ‘highest possible’ are provided. For the elasticity of ED for BC logs, an 
average of the Chinese and Japanese values is taken as the ‘most likely’ with the lowest and 
highest 10% below and above the Japanese and Chinese estimates, respectively. Finally, the 
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transportation costs are derived from van Kooten and Johnston (2014), but since there is 
anecdotal evidence suggesting that the actual costs might be lower  (e.g., in containers as 
backhaul), high and low values are constructed about the point estimate (Table 1). In the 
simulation analysis discussed below and for convenience, the elasticity and transportation values 
are assumed to be drawn from triangular distributions. 
Table 1: Data used to Analysis Economic Impacts of Log Export Restriction for 
Base Years 2011 and 2007 
Item 2011 2007 
Domestic log price ($/m3) 74.03 96.33 
World price ($/m3) 107.61 110.68 
Total log harvest (‘000s m3) 69,328.0 72,166.3 
Domestic log consumption (‘000s m3) 63,878.1 68,827.4 
Log exports from BC (‘000s m3) 5,449.9 3,338.8 
 
Range of Values for Simulations 
[‘Lowest’, ‘Most Likely’, ‘Highest’] 
Elasticity of supply [0.3, 1.0, 1.1] 
Elasticity of demand [-0.2, -1.1, -2.0] 
Elasticity of excess demand [-1.25, -1.54, -1.83] 
Transportation cost ($/m3) [5.0, 10.0, 12.0] 
 
4. RESULTS 
Monte Carlo simulation is used to calculate the welfare measures in Figure 5. In each 
iteration, values of the three elasticities and the transportation cost are drawn from a triangular 
distribution with parameters given in Table 1. We employ 10,000 iterations with random draws 
from triangular distributions about each of the parameters in Table 1 using the ‘Runuran’ 
package in R (version 3.0.1). In addition to the base values provided in Table 1, we examine 
situations where the parameters of the triangular distribution are changed for each of the four 
random variables independently. We also examine conditions for 2011 and 2007 as these 
represent a year of low North American lumber demand conditions and one of high demand, 
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respectively. A comparison of the free trade and optimal levels of log exports across years and 
scenarios is provided in Table 2, while the welfare results are provided in Tables 3 and 4 for 
2011 and 2007, respectively.  
Table 2: British Columbia Log Exports under Free Trade, Maximization of Quota Rent, 
and Maximization of Domestic Benefitsa 
 
2011 
 
2007b 
Scenario 
Free 
Trade 
Quota 
Rent 
Domestic 
Benefit 
 
Free 
Trade 
Quota 
Rent 
Domestic 
Benefit 
1. Base case  7.251 3.625 3.659 
 
3.512 1.756 1.768 
(as in Table 1) (0.136) (0.068) (0.070) 
 
(0.029) (0.015) (0.015) 
        2. Lower transport 7.451 3.726 3.760 
 
3.596 1.798 1.810 
cost [5.0,8.5,10.0] (0.102) (0.051) (0.053) 
 
(0.024) (0.012) (0.013) 
        3. Lower BC εs  7.313 3.656 3.690 
 
3.596 1.798 1.810 
[0.1,1.0,1.1] (0.101) (0.050) (0.052) 
 
(0.024) (0.012) (0.013) 
        4. Less elastic BC εd  7.303 3.652 3.690 
 
3.595 1.797 1.811 
[-0.2,-1.1,-1.2] (0.099) (0.050) (0.052) 
 
(0.024) (0.012) (0.013) 
        5. Greater εED  7.503 3.751 3.789 
 
3.622 1.811 1.825 
[-1.25,-1.54,-2.25] (0.221) (0.111) (0.116) 
 
(0.038) (0.019) (0.020) 
        6. Much greater εED  7.664 3.832 3.874 
 
3.645 1.822 1.837 
[-1.54,-1.80,-2.25] (0.147) (0.074) (0.077) 
 
(0.031) (0.016) (0.016) 
Notes: 
a Standard deviations of 10,000 randomly determined values provided in parentheses. 
b For 2007, the lower transportation costs of scenario 2 are used in scenarios 3 through 6 as well. 
The results in Table 2 indicate that, in a low demand year (2011), the optimal level of log 
exports should be greater than in a year when domestic demand for logs is high (2007). Thus, 
both the theoretical and actual levels of BC log exports were higher in 2011 than 2007 because 
demand for lumber and other wood products in the former year was much lower than in 2007 – 
the year before the collapse in the U.S. housing market due to the financial crisis. More 
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importantly, however, is the comparison between the actual and optimal levels of log exports. 
BC exported 7.86% (5.4 million m3) of the logs harvested in 2011, and 4.63% (3.3 million m3) of 
total log production in 2007. Yet, when compared to optimal log export restrictions, actual log 
exports from British Columbia exceeded the level (QB) that would yield the greatest benefit to 
the province, by some 45% in 2011 and 85% in 2007. It would seem that, while the government 
has adjusted log exports to economic conditions, it has landed at a level of exports that lies 
somewhere between that which yields the highest net benefits to the province and free trade 
amount. Nonetheless, a policy that increases exports toward the free trade level would likely 
reduce rather than enhance the wellbeing of British Columbians as shown in Tables 3 and 4. 
For the scenarios in Tables 3 and 4, there is always an overall net gain to British 
Columbia in going from autarky to free trade in logs. Indeed, this is the conclusion that 
commentators such as Fooks et al. (2013), and Margolick and Uhler (1992), use to justify free 
trade in raw logs and removal of any restrictions on log exports. However, the results in Table 3 
clearly indicate that, once log exports are in place, British Columbia would be made worse off by 
moving to complete free trade in logs. This conclusion is robust across the range of elasticities 
and transportation costs explored here. It would seem, therefore, that the current level of BC log 
exports is preferred to free trade in logs. Is this always the case? 
 The unambiguous answer to this question is that, in the static model where BC faces a 
downward sloping excess demand curve for its logs, the province will always be better off by 
restricting log exports than it would be with free trade in logs. The results in Table 4 are 
ambiguous, however, because actual log exports for 2007 (3.34 million m3) are already close to 
the free trade amount (3.6 million m3). For example, if transportation costs are significantly high 
compared to the excess demand choke price, the province could benefit from free trade in logs. 
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The reason is that the high transportation costs reduce the available quota rent, and thereby it 
pays to increase exports to the free trade level. For the lower transportation cost scenarios 3 
through 6, there remains a cost to moving to free trade in logs, although the associated high 
standard deviations suggest that this is not always the case. That is, area (y+g) in Figure 5 is 
almost always but not unambiguously smaller than area j.  
Table 3: Welfare Analysis of the Costs of Log Export Restrictions, 2011 ($ millions)a 
  
Autarky 
to free 
trade   
Welfare impacts of moving from the current restricted 
level of log exports to free trade in logs 
Scenariob 
Net 
Gain   
Gain to 
consumers 
Gain to 
producers Net gain 
Quota 
rent 
Transport 
cost 
Base case  53.608 
 
-50.576 -22.243 -72.819 119.843 83.902 
(as in Table 1) (3.911) 
 
(6.047) (9.911) (10.717) (7.008) (8.065) 
        Lower 
transportation 46.353 
 
-56.168 -37.263 -93.431 133.199 68.087 
 cost [5.0,8.5,10.0] (1.902) 
 
(5.977) (7.253) (3.752) (2.320) (2.988) 
        Lower BC εs  51.448 
 
-52.310 -26.802 -79.112 123.976 79.185 
[0.1,1.0,1.1] (2.144) 
 
(5.636) (7.203) (4.831) (3.076) (3.753) 
        Less elastic BC εd  53.057 
 
-59.552 -18.893 -78.445 123.976 79.081 
[-0.2,-1.1,-1.2] (1.847) 
 
(3.343) (5.026) (4.790) (3.076) (3.748) 
        Greater εED  53.108 
 
-57.590 -19.862 -77.452 123.976 81.241 
[-1.25,-1.54,-2.25] (2.778) 
 
(8.172) (10.434) (5.149) (3.076) (4.369) 
        Much greater εED  54.516 
 
-62.073 -13.971 -76.044 123.976 82.986 
[-1.54,-1.80,-2.25] (2.389) 
 
(7.068) (8.726) (4.945) (3.076) (4.015) 
Notes: 
a Based on data for 2011. Standard deviations of 10,000 randomly determined values provided in 
parentheses. 
b In order, the values in [ ] refer to the ‘lowest possible’, ‘most likely’ and ‘highest possible’ 
values for the triangle distribution. The base case scenarios are provided in Table 1.  
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Table 4: Welfare Analysis of the Costs of Log Export Restrictions, 2007 ($ millions)a 
  
Autarky 
to free 
trade   
Welfare impacts of moving from the current restricted 
level of log exports to free trade in logs 
Scenariob 
Net 
Gain   
Gain to 
consumers 
Gain to 
producers Net gain 
Quota 
rent 
Transport 
cost 
1. Base case  22.366 
 
-6.476 14.066 7.589 11.747 38.028 
(as in Table 1) (0.855) 
 
(1.248) (1.806) (2.671) (1.885) (1.679) 
        2. Lower 
transportation 19.940 
 
-9.589 9.102 -0.488 17.398 32.853 
 cost [5.0,8.5,10.0] (0.721) 
 
(1.287) (1.692) (2.051) (1.421) (1.342) 
        3. Lower BC εs  19.940 
 
-9.589 9.102 -0.488 17.398 32.853 
[0.1,1.0,1.1] (0.721) 
 
(1.287) (1.692) (2.051) (1.421) (1.342) 
        4. Less elastic BC  20.444 
 
-10.944 10.520 -0.424 17.398 32.844 
εd [-0.2,-1.1,-1.2]c (0.632) 
 
(1.053) (1.324) (2.045) (1.421) (1.342) 
        5. Greater εED  20.113 
 
-10.577 10.262 -0.315 17.398 33.094 
[-1.25,-1.54,-2.25] (0.738) 
 
(1.734) (2.075) (2.051) (1.421) (1.358) 
        6. Much greater εED  20.259 
 
-11.416 11.248 -0.168 17.398 33.299 
[-1.54,-1.80,-2.25] (0.717) 
 
(1.592) (1.803) (2.038) (1.421) (1.333) 
Notes: 
a Based on data for 2007. Standard deviations of 10,000 randomly determined values provided in 
parentheses. 
b The values in [ ] refer to the ‘lowest possible’, ‘most likely’ and ‘highest possible’ values for 
the triangle distribution. The base case scenarios are provided in Table 1; scenarios 3 through 6 
also employ the lower transportation costs of scenario 2. 
c Results are similar if the absolute value of εd is increased from 1.1 to 1.5 or reduced to 0.8.  
 
5. CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 
Economists have generally condemned British Columbia’s log export policies, arguing 
that the province is forgoing significant benefits from failing to permit free trade in logs. The 
province’s policy regarding log exports is primarily designed to protect and promote downstream 
processing jobs, a questionable objective at best. Yet, historically the government has recognized 
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the potential employment and other benefits that can be captured by permitting some log exports 
when lumber and other wood product markets are weak. Because log exports continue as in the 
past, albeit at various levels depending on (sometimes arbitrary) factors that affect policy, the 
proper comparison in evaluating BC’s restrictions on log exports is the benefit that is gained in 
moving from current levels of log exports to those expected under free trade.  
The theoretical and empirical results in this paper suggest that British Columbia’s current 
policy of restricting log exports is preferred to free trade, ceteris paribus. As demonstrated here, 
the level of log exports that maximizes the total economic surplus available to British 
Columbians is slightly greater than one-half of the free trade level of exports, or slightly more 
than the level that garners the greatest quota rent. Any other level of log exports is inferior. From 
this perspective, too many logs may have been exported in both 2007 and 2011, at least given the 
assumptions upon which the analysis used in this study are based. 
Should British Columbia strive to permit free trade in logs? This is a different question. 
For one thing, it depends on what happens to the policy-induced, scarcity (quota) rent. If it is 
entirely wasted via high transaction costs associated with obtaining log-export permits, the 
province might be as well off promoting free trade in logs. If the available rents are captured by 
importers or exporters that subsequently transfer the windfalls out of the province, free trade may 
also be preferred. However, if the government is able to capture the rents and/or if rents are used 
to promote investment in R&D, silviculture and manufacturing facilities, then log export 
restrictions are to be embraced. Indeed, export restrictions might make logs even more valuable 
than they would be under free trade, thereby promoting investment in growing forests. 
There remains one aspect of BC’s log export restrictions that favours free trade. In a 
global economy, log export restrictions are viewed as an impediment to trade. As such, they 
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could be the target of counter measures, whether duties on imports of other Canadian goods, a 
bargaining chip used against Canada in trade negotiations, or some other measure that harms 
British Columbia or Canada more broadly. Then the case for free trade in logs is a stronger one.  
Finally, the results in this study are driven by the linearity assumptions. While the 
assumption of linear supply and demand underlies the majority of studies in forest products 
trade, Fooks et al. (2013) assume semi-logaritmic functional forms because the price elasticities 
of supply and demand remain constant throughout. Whether this is assumption leads to 
significantly different results than those identified above is a subject for further research. Our 
view is that the use of nonlinear supply and demand functions greatly increases the complexity 
of the analysis, but with little in the way of additional insights.  
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7. APPENDIX 
Following van Kooten (2002), we begin by examining the quota rent available in the 
international market as a function of the quantity traded: 
[8] R(Q) = (PED – PES′ ) Q = [(k0 – k1 Q) – (r + w Q + T)] Q, 
where Q refers to the quantity of logs exported by BC, r = 
β
αβ
+
+
b
ba  = PA (autarkic price), and w 
= 
β
β
+b
b . By setting PED = PES′, we find the respective free-trade quantity and price: 
[9] QW = 
1
0
kw
Trk
+
−−  and Pw = 
1
01 )(
kw
Tkwrk
+
−+ .  
The quota rent R(Q) is given by area QR × ( R lIntP ' – T) in Figure 5; it varies as Q changes, with 
R(Q=0) = 0 and R(Qw=0) = 0. Upon setting the first derivative of R(Q) to zero and solving, we 
find the level of log exports that maximizes the quota rent: 
[10] QR* = 
)(2
)(
1
0
kw
Trk
+
+−  = ½ QW. 
Substituting [10] into [9] gives:  
[11] R(QR*) = ¼ 





+
−−
1
2
0 )(
kw
Trk .  
The quota rent accrues to logging companies and forest landowners in British Columbia.  
When there is a quota on log exports, however, provincial log producers forego some 
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quasi-rent as a result of reducing output below the unrestricted free trade amount.5
To find the optimal level at which to restrict log exports (or quota) from the perspective 
of British Columbia, it is necessary to determine the level of trade that maximizes the sum of the 
quasi-rents accruing to log producers (producer surplus) and wood processors (measured as a 
consumer surplus under the derived demand function) plus the quota rent in the international 
market: 
 The reason is 
that, while a quota increases the demand price in the international market compared to free trade, 
the supply price falls; in the domestic market it is the supply price that determines the price 
processors pay for logs (see Figure 5). Naturally, domestic lumber and other wood product 
manufacturers prefer zero log exports since this keeps the price of logs at their lowest (at PA in 
Figure 5).  
[12] B(Q) = ½ (PES – a) (qd + Q) + (PED –  PES – T) Q + ½ (α – PES) qd , 
where PES is the (excess) supply price and PED the (excess) demand price found in the 
international market; qd represents logs consumed domestically; and Q = qs – qd refers to exports 
of logs, with qs the amount harvested in BC. The first term on the right-hand-side of [12] refers 
to the quasi-rent accruing to log producers, the second term to the quota rent (if any), and the 
third term to the quasi-rent (consumer surplus) accruing to domestic lumber and other wood 
product manufacturers.6
As the first term deals with the producer surplus in the domestic log market, we substitute 
  
                                                 
5 Quasi-rent refers to the quantity sold multiplied by the supply price minus the variable cost of supplying 
that quantity (area under the supply curve); it does not include the policy-induced scarcity (or quota) rent, 
which we measure separately. See van Kooten and Folmer (2004, pp.38-44) for further discussion. 
6 As van Kooten and Johnston (2014) show, the surplus area under the derived demand curve for logs is a 
quasi-rent measured as a (producer) surplus above the supply curve and below the output price faced by 
lumber manufacturers and other wood processors.  
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for Q and rewrite equation [12] as:  
[13] B(Q) = ½ (PES – a) qs  + (PED –  PES – T) Q + ½ (α – PES) qd . 
Clearly, if there are no log exports, the benefit to BC is as follows:  
[14] B(Q=0) = ½ (PA – a) qA + ½ (α – PA) qA = ½ (α – a) qA = ½ 
β
α
+
−
b
a 2)( , 
since qA = (α–a)/(b+β). Notice that wellbeing depends only on the intercept and slope parameters 
of the domestic supply and demand functions, and these in turn depend on the elasticities of 
supply and demand. 
When there is free trade, QW is exported but there is no quota rent (as noted above) so the 
surplus can be measured solely in the domestic market:  
[15] B(Q=QW) = ½ (Pw – a) qs + ½ (α – Pw) qd. 
Substituting qs = 1/b (Pw – a) and qd = 1/β (α – Pw) into [15] gives:  
[16] B(Q=Ww) = 2222 )(
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Upon substituting for Pw from [9], 
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Again wellbeing depends on the intercept and slope parameters of the domestic supply and 
demand functions, and hence the price elasticities of supply and demand, as well as the intercept 
and slope parameters (and thus the price elasticity) of the excess demand function.  
Finally, we consider whether some degree of log exports between zero and QW would 
lead to greater welfare to British Columbians than an amount QW. In this case, we set the first 
derivative of B(Q) in [13] to zero and solve for Q. 
[18] B′(Q) = ½ wqs – (k1 + w)Q + (PED – PES – T) – ½ wqd = 0.  
=> ½ w (qs – qd) – (k1 + w)Q + k0 – k1Q – r – wQ – T = 0 
=> ½ w Q – (k1 + w)Q + k0 – k1Q – r – wQ – T = 0 
=> – 3/2 w Q – 2 k1Q + k0 – r – T = 0 
Then,  
[19] QB = WQ
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QB > 0 as long as (k0 – r – T) > 0, which will be true as long as there is adequate external demand 
for British Columbia’s raw logs and transportation costs are not too large – that is, trade occurs. 
Further, QB < QW because the denominator in [19] is greater than the numerator. Finally, from 
result [10], if 





+
+
1
1
43
22
kw
kw  < ½ then QB < QR*. This implies that 4w + 4k1 < 3w + 4k1, or that 4w < 
3w, which is clearly not the case. Thus, we conclude that 0 < QR* < QB < QW. However, 
numerical analysis is required to shed further light on these results for the case of British 
Columbia. 
